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NEW MEXICO'S ANALOGUE TO 28 U.S.C.
§1292(b): INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS COME
TO THE STATE COURTS
The 1971 New Mexico Legislature enacted into law an analogue to
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 1 The new statute provides:
A. In any civil action or special statutory proceeding in the district court, when the district judge makes an interlocutory order or
decision which does not practically dispose of the merits of the
action, and he believes the order or decision involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order or decision
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he
shall so state in writing in the order or decision.
B. The Supreme Court or court of appeals has jurisdiction over an
appeal from such an interlocutory order or decision, as appellate
jurisdiction may be vested in these courts. Within ten days after
entry of the order or decision, any party aggrieved may file with the
clerk of the supreme court or court of appeals an application for an
order allowing an appeal, accompanied by a copy of the order or
decision. If an application has not been acted upon within twenty
days, it shall be deemed denied.
C. Application under this section for an order allowing appeal
does not stay proceedings in the district court unless so ordered by
the district judge or judge or justice of the court to which application is made. 2
Prior to the enactment of this statute, New Mexico law restricted
appeal in civil actions to "final" decisions 3 and interlocutory
"judgments, orders, or decisions of the district courts, as practically
dispose of the merits of the action." 4 The new statute creates appellate jurisdiction over a new class of cases in which neither final
judgment nor practical disposition of the case has occurred.
The analogous federal statute's purpose was set out in the Senate
Report on the bill. The state statute's purpose is presumably the
same:
The bill results from a growing awareness of the need for expedition
of cases pending before the district courts. Many cases which are
filed in the Federal district courts require the district judge to enter1. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-10-3 (Repl. 1970, Supp. 1971). With minor exceptions the
wording used in the two statutes is identical.
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-10-3 (Repl. 1970, Supp. 1971).
3. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-2-1(5.1) (Repl. 1970).
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-2-1(5.2) (Repl. 1970).
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tain motions at an early stage in the proceedings, which, if determined, against the plaintiff, result in a final order which would then
be appealable to the circuit courts of appeals of the United States.
However, such motions, if determined in the plaintiff's favor, are
interlocutory since they do not end the litigation and are not therefore, under existing provisions of law, appealable. For example, in a
recent case a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction was filed in
the district court early in the proceedings. The district court denied
the motion and the matter then proceeded to trial. The disposition
of that case took almost 8 months. Upon final order the case was
appealed and the court of appeals determined that the district court
did not have jurisdiction and entered an order accordingly. Had this
legislation been in effect at that time, the district judge could have
stated in writing his opinion that the motion was controlling and the
defendant could thereupon make application to the court of appeals
for a review of the order denying the motion. Had the court of
appeals entertained such motion and reached the conclusion that it
ultimately did, it would have resulted in a saving of time of the
district court and considerable expense of the litigants.'
Guidelines for use of the New Mexico statute can be derived from
examination of decisions in the federal courts. A hasty examination
of the cases decided under the federal statute may lead to uncertainty as to what types of orders are appealable, the meaning of
the statutory terms, and the mechanical requirements of the statute's
operation.6 In many respects the Senate Report on the bill is misleading in that it implies that the statute's operation is restricted to
"exceptional" cases and is inapplicable to the ordinary negligence
action. On the other hand, looming in the background is the danger
that the statute may be used by defendant's lawyers as a method of
unnecessarily delaying trial level litigation. This comment surveys
some of the rules that have been applied to the federal statute in the
hope that New Mexico courts can avoid some of the sources of
difficulty on the federal level. 7
SECTION 1292(b) OF THE JUDICIAL CODE:
THE FEDERAL PRACTICE
A. Orders Appealable
Federal courts have not limited appeal to a specific type of order
but rather have looked to the underlying principles of the statute.
5. S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. at 2-3 (1958), 158 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5256.

6. See Annot., 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (1966).

7. For a further discussion of the applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1966) see
Holtzoff, Interlocutory Appeals in the FederalCourts, 47 Geo. L.J. 474 (1959); Wright, The
Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, 23 F.R.D. 199 (1959); Comment, Discretionary
Appeals of District Court Interlocutory Orders: A Guided Tour Through Section 1292(b) of
the Judicial Code, 69 Yale L.J. 333 (1959).
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Although this approach precludes categorizing of appealable orders,

the proper application of the statute requires flexibility.
District courts have certified orders denying motions for summary
judgment rather consistently.'

Denials of motions to dismiss, except

on jurisdictional9 or constitutional' 0 grounds, have generally not
been certified. 1" District Courts have refused to certify discovery
orders,' 2 orders denying a stay,1 3 orders granting' " or denying' I a
new trial, orders denying a motion to vacate attachment,' 6 and orders denying a motion to quash service.

'

On the other hand, they

have certified for appeal questions of venue, 1 ' denial of a motion to
strike certain defenses in an answer,' 9 and an order to an attorney to
cease representing a particular client. 0
Federal circuit courts have refused to entertain certified appeals
involving discovery orders, 2' denial 2 and issuance 2 3 of orders for
8. Tyndal v. United States, 295 F. Supp. 448 (E.D.N.C. 1969); Keogh v. Pearson, 244 F.
Supp. 482 (D.D.C. 1965); Martorano v. Hughes, 222 F. Supp. 789 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); King v.
Int'l Ass'n of Mach., 215 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Cal. 1963); Mamula v. Local 1211, United
Steelworkers of America, 202 F. Supp. 348 (W.D. Pa. 1962). Contra, Marco v. Dulles, 177
F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Afran Transp. Co. v. Nat'l Maritime Union, 177 F. Supp.
610 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Central Foundry Co., 167 F. Supp. 821
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
9. Northland Paper Co. v. Mohawk Tablet Co., 271 F. Supp. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Brantley v. Devereaux, 237 F. Supp. 156 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Hendricks v. Alcoa Steamship
Co., 206 F. Supp. 693 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
10. Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Bell
v. Georgia Dental Ass'n, 231 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
11. Chas. Pfizer & Co. v. Laboratori Pro-Ter Prodotti Therapeutici, 278 F. Supp. 148
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); DeLorenzo v. Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp., 268 F. Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Wong, 254 F. Supp. 66 (D.P.R. 1966); Baett v. Burt, 250 F.
Supp. 904 (S.D. Iowa 1966); Petit v. Am. Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Berger v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Contra, Kauffman v. Dreyfus
Fund, Inc., 51 F.R.D. 18 (D.N.J. 1969).
12. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. General Electric Co., 230 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1964)
(motion to require an answer to interrogatories); McSparran v. Bethlehem-Cuba Iron Mines
Co., 26 F.R.D. 619 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (motion to produce).
13. Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 309 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
14. United States v. Canale, 176 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
15. Winston v. Roe, 246 F. Supp. 246 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
16. Wilcox v. Richmond, F. & P. R.R., 270 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
17. Martinez v. Karageorgis, 235 F. Supp. 1012 (D.P.R. 1963); Haraburda v. United
States Steel Corp., 187 F. Supp. 86 (W.D. Mich. 1960).
18. Orzulak v. Fed. Commerce & Navigation Co., 168 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
19. Brunswick Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 291 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
20. E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
21. United States v. Salter, 421 F.2d 1393 (1st Cir. 1970) (order in Internal Revenue
Service subpeona); United States v. Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1959) (motion to
produce); see Judge Wright's dissent in Groover, Christie & Merritt v. LoBianco, 336 F.2d
969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (motion to produce).
22. Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1969); United States Rubber Co. v.
Wright, 359 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1966); Kraus v. Bd. of County Road Comm'ns, 364 F.2d
919 (6th Cir. 1966). Contra, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776 (5th Cir.
1963).
23. Spurlin v. General Motors, 426 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1970); Markham v. Holt, 369 F.2d
940 (5th Cir. 1966).
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summary judgment, denial of motions for interpleader, 2 4 denial of
motions to dismiss, 2 5 orders extending the time for filing of
claims, 2 6 and rulings on the admissibility of evidence. 2 7 Denial of
motions'to amend complaints 2 8 and pretrial orders 2 9 have been
denied consistently. At the same time, circuit courts have permitted
interlocutory appeals from an order granting a stay in the proceedings,30 but have denied appeals when the order to stay had been
denied appeal at the district court level. 3 '
B. Technical Requirements
A number of technical requirements have been imposed by the
federal courts, the most conspicuous being that an appeal will not be
heard unless the district judge has issued his certificate. 3 2 This requirement stems from the desire to grant both appellate and trial3
courts the opportunity to review the justification for the appeal.
Federal courts also have required that the certificate contain an
actual statement that the question meets the criteria imposed by the
statute.3 4 Certification need not be included in the original order,
but an order can subsequently be amended to include certification.3 s If the original order does not contain the certificate, the
Tenth Circuit has adopted the rule that the time in which to petition
for appeal begins on the date of the supplemental or amended
order.

6

Appellate courts have refused to entertain appeals where the court
felt that the question certified was not "ripe, ' 33' or where a decision
24. Thompson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 422 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1970).
25. Molybdenum Corp. of America v. Kasey, 279 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1960); Gottesman
v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959). Contra, Oskoian v. Canuel, 264 F.2d
591 (1st Cir. 1959).
26. Petition of World Shipping, Ltd., 373 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1967).
27. Control Data Corp. v. Int'l Business Mach. Corp., 421 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1970).
28. D'Ippolito v. Cities Service Co., 374 F.2d 643 (2d Cit. 1967); DeNubilo v. United
States, 343 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1965); Wall v. Cheasapeake & Ohio R.R., 339 F.2d 434 (4th
Cir. 1964).
29. Carey v. Greyhound Co., 424 F.2d 485 (9th Cit. 1970).
30. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Adkins, 330 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1964).
31. Japan Line, Ltd. v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1969).
32. Baxter v. United Forest Products Co., 406 F.2d 1120 (8th Cit. 1969); Williams v.
Maxwell, 396 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1968); Cram v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 375 F.2d 670 (4th
Cir. 1967); United States v. Al-Con Dev. Corp., 271 F.2d 901 (4th Cit. 1959); Milbert v.
Bison Laboratories, 260 F.2d 431 (3d Cit. 1959).
33. See H.R. Rep. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958).
34. Benton Harbor Malleable Indus. v. Int'l U., U.A.A. & A.I.W., 355 F.2d 70 (6th Cir.
1966); United States v. Gottfried, 278 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1960).
35. Beverly Hills Fed. S. & L. Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 234 F. Supp. 698
(D.D.C. 1964); Milbert v. Bison Laboratories, 260 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1958).
36. Houston Fearless Corp. v. Teter, 313 F.2d 91 (10th Cir. 1962).
37. Molybdenum Corp. of America v. Kasey, 279 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1960).
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in the matter would be "hypothetical or advisory." 3 8 The federal
that have otherwise obtained
statute is inapplicable to 3matters
9
finality for appeal purposes.
These technical requirements are essential in that they insure that
the statute will not be abused. They demand that " [e] ach application be looked at in light of the underlying purpose of the
statute." 4"0 Since it is discretionary with both trial and appellate
courts to permit or deny appeal, the statute has built-in safeguards
which should prevent its abuse. If judges on either level have legitimate misgivings about the disruptive effects that an appeal might
have on the litigation, appeal should be denied. Since the statute is
double discretionary, mandamus generally does not lie to compel
certification. 4 1
THREE CONTROLLING TERMS
of
both federal and state statutes are three controlling
At the heart
terms: (1) the order or decision must be one that involves "a controlling question of law"; (2) the question must be one "as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion"; and (3) appeal
from the order or decision must be one that "may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation."
A. A ControllingQuestion of Law
This requirement was designed to insure that the statute not be
used as a delaying tactic by permitting spurious appeal. Federal legislative history indicates that the term probably means "serious to the
litigation either practically or legally." ' 4 2 Questions collateral to the
basic issues in the lawsuit are not controlling, but the question need
not be dispositive of the litigation.4 3 Controlling questions include
38. Control Data Corp. v. Int'l Business Mach. Corp., 421 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1970).
39. Johnston v. Cartwright, 355 F.2d 32 (8th Cit. 1966). Moore says the statute is also
inapplicable to orders otherwise appealable as of right, e.g., under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), or
under the Forgay-Conrador Cohen rules. See 9 J.Moore, Federal Practice 110.22[2], at
259 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Moore, Fed. PracticeI.
40. Hadjipateras v. Pacifica, S.A., 290 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1961). Courts have cited
"urgency" as justification for federal court appeal. See Mamula v. Local 1211, United
Steelworkers of America, 202 F. Supp. 348 (W.D.Pa. 1962).
Disregard of this approach presents innumerable difficulties with which many federal
courts have struggled, e.g., Kroch v. Texas Co., 167 F. Supp. 947, 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1958),
holding that the statute is to be used only in exceptional cases. The exceptional case
approach has been uniformly criticized. See 9 Moore, Fed. Practice, at 259; Wright, supra
note 7, at 205; Comment, supra note 7, at 359.
41. D'Ippolito v. Cities Service Co., 374 F.2d 643 (2d Cit. 1967).
42. See Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 11, at 18 (testimony of Judge Maris).
43. United States v. Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1959).
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"[a] question of whether a claim exists as a matter of law; a question
of whether a defense is available, if, being available, it will defeat the
claim; a question as to jurisdiction of the subject matter; a question
of the efficacy of process; a question as to proper venue; and a
question as to the right to maintain the action (footnotes
omitted)." 4 4 Moore lists as additional controlling questions orders
involving "transfer of the action, right to jury trial, disqualification
of counsel, or discovery. "In
B. Substantial Groundfor Difference of Opinion
A question involving "substantial ground for difference of
opinion" should be certified when the other statutory criteria have
been met and the arguments opposing the decision may create doubt
as to its correctness. It applies to the ruling where decisions on the
point of law are indefinite or unclear, 4 6 or where the decision may
be contrary to established law in the jurisdiction. A question of first
impression falls into this category, 4 7 as do questions where the
precedents are conflicting.4 8
C. Materially Advance Ultimate Termination of the Litigation
This requirement is satisfied when the appeal may result in an

acceleration of the litigative process. Competency of witnesses,
prejudicial statements to the jury, instructions to the jury, and
rulings of law as to the burden of proof seldom qualify since they
44. Moore, Fed. Practice, supra note 39, citing Mills v. Electric Autolite Co., 403 F.2d
429 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'd 396 U.S. 375 (1970), Benitez Rexach v. United States, 390 F.2d
631 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 833 (1969); Falik v. United States, 343 F.2d 38
(2d Cir. 1965) ("... question[s] of whether a claim exists as a matter of law .... "); Time,
Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1969); Shapiro v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp.,
274 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1960); Banana Distribs., Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 269 F.2d 790 (2d
Cir. 1959) ("... . whether a defense is available, if, being available, it will defeat the
claim .... "); Tcherepin v. Knight, 371 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1967), rev'd 389 U.S. 332
(1967); Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. McGinnes 268 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1959); Rogers v.
Schilling, 268 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (".... jurisdiction of the subject matter .... ");
Penrod Drilling Co. v. Johnson, 414 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1969), Construction Prods. Corp. v.
Di-Noc Chem. Arts, Inc. 343 F.2d 166 (4th Cir. 1965) (". .. proper venue .... "); Jaftex
Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960); Pavlovscak v. Lewis, 274 F.2d
743 [sic 523] (3d Cir. 1960) ("... . efficacy of process .... "); Federal Resources Corp. v.
Shoni Uranium Corp., 408 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1969); Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 270
F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1959) cert. denied 361 U.S. 962 (1960); Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc. 264
F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959) ("... . right to maintain the action .... ").'
45. See Moore, Fed. Practice, supra note 39, at 260. For "right to jury trial," Moore cites
Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on merits, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
46. Keogh v. Pearson, 244 F. Supp. 482 (D.D.C. 1965).
47. Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
48. See Ozulak v. Fed. Commerce & Navigation Co., 168 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
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generally occur too near judgment. 4 9 An exception here is an order
granting a motion for a new trial, since reversal would make the
second trial unnecessary.'I
USING THE STATUTE
Mechanics of the statute's use are relatively simple. If the order is
such that it "does not practically dispose of the merits of the
action"' ' or, in the federal courts, "is not otherwise appealable," ' 2
the parties may, either at the hearing where the order is denied or
through subsequent amendment of the order, request that the district court certify the question for appeal. The party petitioning the
court states the controlling question of law and the reasons that the
order should be appealed. If the district judge finds that appeal
should be permitted, he states that the order "involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion ....." An application for leave to appeal, including the

copy of the order and motion, are sent to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the matter.5 " The district court judge may or may
not stay the action at this point.5 ' If after review the appellate court
decides to permit the appeal, it issues an order and the appeal is
taken.5 s If an application has not been acted upon within twenty
days at the appellate court level, it is "deemed denied." ' 6
CONCLUSION
Permitting interlocutory appeals should add considerable flexibility to the State's appellate procedure. The statute, for example,
might be used to facilitate prompt appellate determination of important new questions of law.5 I
The federal courts have not restricted use of the interlocutory
appeals statute to any rigid category of orders. The significant consideration is not what type of order is before the court but instead
whether or not certification of the order would conform to the
49. Comment, supra note 7, at 358-59.
50. Id. at 359.
51. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-10-3(A) (Repl. 1970, Supp. 1971).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1966).
53. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-10-3(B) (Repl. 1970, Supp. 1971). See 4A Bender's Federal
Practice Forms, Form 4758, at 392 (Rev. 1970), for an example of an application for
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1966).
54. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-10-3(C) (Repl. 1970, .upp. 1971).
55. See 4A Bender's Federal Practice Forms, Form 4759, at 395 (Rev. 1970).
56. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-10-3(B) (Repl. 1970, Supp. 1971).
57. Comment, supra note 7, at 335, citing 4 Moore, Fed. Practice at 1220.
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underlying purpose of the statute. The statute appears to be designed
to allow review of those interlocutory district court decisions which
might be reversed on appeal, and if reversed, would either terminate
the litigation or settle a matter which could prolong litigation either
by unnecessarily complicating issues to be tried or requiring litigation
based on issues that lack legal merit. Careful application of the
statute should minimize the dangers inherent in permitting appellate
review of interlocutory orders.

